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DEREGULATION AND LOCAL AIRLINE SERVICE-
AN ASSESSMENT OF RISKS
RAYMOND J. RASENBERGER*
I. OVERVIEWS UBSTANTIAL DEREGULATION of air transportation, such
as proposed by the Aviation Act of 1975, risks permanent and
serious harm to the domestic airline system, particularly the exten-
sive system of certificated local airline service. The effects of dereg-
ulation may be felt in several major respects: (1) increased con-
centration of air transportation services in the hands of a few very
large carriers, (2) less reliable airline service, particularly in small-
er air transportation markets, (3) higher fares in many markets,
and (4) the indirect cost to the American economy and national
economic and social goals of less reliable and less convenient airline
service.
These risks of deregulation are admittedly only risks neither pro-
ponents nor opponents of deregulation can be certain what will hap-
pen until it does happen. That fact, however, underscores what is
perhaps the most fundamental weakness of the Aviation Act of
1975. It would substitute the risk of a theory for a certainty of a
system which works well and statutory imperatives designed to
keep it that way.
The economic provisions of the Federal Aviation Act are a com-
bination of strong policy goals and broad discretion. That discre-
tion is tempered only by the stated goals and conventional require-
* A.B., Dartmouth College; A.M., Syracuse University; J.D., George Wash-
ington University. Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C. This article relies in part
upon comments on the proposed Aviation Act of 1975 prepared by the author
and others and submitted to the Civil Aeronautics Board in Docket 28490 on
January 20, 1976 on behalf of eight local service airlines. In that connection, the
author wishes to acknowledge particularly the assistance of Charles S. Murphy,
Esquire and Emory N. Ellis, Esq., Counsel for the various other local service
airlines, in developing the views expressed herein.
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ments for administrative due process. In lieu of this approach, the
Aviation Act of 1975 would invest certain regulatory theories with
the dignity of policy objectives.1 In other words, it would convert
means into ends.
In so doing, it would also substantially narrow the discretion of
the CAB to achieve the basic goals of national policy set forth in
the statute. For more than thirty years the CAB has pursued the
development of a system of airline service "properly adapted to
the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and the national de-
fense."' It has done so primarily on the basis of experience rather
than theory. Local service carriers were an experiment, and even
after these carriers obtained permanent authority3 their service to
many points was experimental." Supplemental airlines grew out of
IThe Aviation Act of 1975 would amend the statement of policy of the
Act to equate "maximum reliance on competitive market forces" and "encourage-
ment of new carriers" with the other policy goals. The full text of the existing
declaration of policy is as follows:
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. 1302 (1970).
Sec. 102. In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties
under this Act, the Board shall consider the following, among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the
public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the for-
eign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to rec-
ognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest
degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such
transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordi-
nate transportation by air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competi-
tive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics.
249 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1970).
8 Pub. L. No. 84-741, 70 Stat. 591 (1956).
4 E.g., the so-called "use it or lose it" policy adopted in the late 1950's. See
Seven States Area Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 680 (1958).
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experimental awards to large irregular carriers." All-cargo service
has been an experiment, ' so also the growing role of commuter air-
lines." In dealing with fare innovations and charter concepts the
Board has also relied heavily on experimentation." The proposed
legislation would substitute economic dogmatism for this em-
piricism.
Moreover, if the dogma is wrong, more is at stake than the air
transportation system. That system is designed to support larger
national objectives-the economic development of all parts of the
United States and reduction of the geographic and economic iso-
lation of small cities and remote areas.' The risks to such larger ob-
jectives are very real, as experience in Canada has taught. ° In short,
if these economic theories are to become national goals, they had
better be right. The remainder of this paper will examine the risk-
the very real risk-that they may not be right."
The Air Transportation System Today
Let us acknowledge at the outset that the existing air transport
regulatory system, like most things, does not work as well as it
5 Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, CAB Order Nos. E-13436 (1959),
E-14196 (1959). Many "Large Irregulars" eventually became Supplemental
Airlines pursuant to Pub. L. No. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 (1962).
6 Air Freight Case, 10 C.A.B. 572 (1949).
7 E.g., Part 298 Weight Limit Investigation, CAB Order No. 72-7-61 (July 18,
1972).
8 Under the Board policies adopted in the Domestic Passenger Fare Investiga-
tion, discount fares must be temporary in nature, their renewal being subject to
experience data showing a net benefit to the carrier. See DPFI, Phase 5, CAB
Order No. 72-12-18 (Dec. 5, 1972). Many new charter concepts have also been
experimental. See, e.g., CAB Special Reg. 85 (Aug. 7, 1975) (one-stop inclusive
tour charters).
One of the reasons given for permanent certification of local service airlines
was "the promotion of American commerce and national unity." S. REP. No.
124, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955). See also 81 CONG. REC. 8883 (1937).
'
0 The possibilities of adverse effects of deregulation on other national goals
are highlighted by a paper entitled Some Lessons from Transport Deregulation in
Canada delivered by John Heads of the Canadian Transport Commission at a
meeting of the Transportation Research Forum in San Francisco, October 10-12,
1974. The paper calls attention to the conflict which has developed between poli-
cies adopted beginning in 1967 looking toward easier abandonment and more
flexible pricing by railroads and the desire to promote economic development of
all geographic regions, especially the Canadian west. Mr. Heads pointed out: "In
the years since the 1967 Act in Canada, a major cause of Western complaint has
been that transportation is no longer used as an instrument of national policy."
"This analysis is necessarily limited to scheduled airline passenger service.
No views are intended to be expressed herein regarding cargo or charter services.
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should. The issue raised by the proposed legislation, however, is
not whether some things about the present system of regulation
should be changed, but whether they need to be changed by legis-
lation as distinguished from agency action under the existing sta-
tute. As a point of departure, it may be useful to review how the
CAB has operated within the existing statutory framework.
I First, as has been noted, the existing statute calls for the develop-
ment of a comprehensive system of air transportation for the Unit-
ed States, a system which stresses competition and produces eco-
nomical and efficient service at reasonable charges. These goals
are not essentially different from those that appear in the litany of
deregulation.
Supporters of deregulation, however, maintain that the Board
has not properly employed its broad discretion to achieve these
objectives. There is something to this view if attention is focused
on the first half of the 1970's when the policies of the Board, or
at least a majoriy of it, were hostile to competition. It is signifi-
cant, however, that these hostile policies have in fact already
come to an end without the enactment of new legislation. More-
over, a longer view of CAB history shows a Board far more recep-
tive to competition than it is given credit for.
The air transportation system which the Board began to regu-
late in 1938 was essentially a series of adjoining route monopolies.
Since that time, as one proponent of deregulation has acknowl-
edged "the proportion of monopoly traffic in trunk carrier opera-
tions has steadily diminished."'" Moreover, contrary to the con-
ventional wisdom of deregulation, the CAB has not been opposed
to entry of new carriers.
It is true that the CAB has not followed a practice of certificat-
ing new trunklines.1' in addition to the grandfather carriers. That
fact alone is misleading, however. In its early years, the CAB cer-
tificated over twenty grandfather carriers, a substantial number of
participants in an industry that earned less than $60 million in
2Prepared Testimony of James C. Miller, III dated December 15, 1975,
CAB Docket No. 27417 (Domestic Load Factor Standards). This substantial in-
crease in the competitiveness of the system is also confirmed and described in
the CAB staff study of THE DOMESTIC RouTE SYSTEM: ANALYSIS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS (October, 1974).
2" An important exception was Trans Caribbean Airlines, certificated to Puerto
Rico in 1957, Service to Puerto Rico, 26 C.A.B. 72 (1957).
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revenues that year. Since that time, the Board has concluded that
the development of the industry would best be achieved, not by
certificating more trunks, but by the encouragement of specialist
carriers which had an incentive to develop air transportation in
areas where trunklines had shown a lack of interest.
Over fifty new domestic airlines have been certificated since
1938, including over twenty local service airlines, eight all-cargo
airlines, twenty-five large irregular (which later became thirteen
supplemental) airlines, five helicopter airlines, and a variety of
other carriers rendering specialized kinds of service." To a large
extent, as the grandfather carriers will attest, these new entrants
have been competitive with some or all the services the grand-
father carriers were providing."
A deeper look into CAB regulation of prices also portrays far
more price flexibility and competition than commonly acknowl-
edged. For its entire history prior to its decision in the Domestic
Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI)," the CAB did not prescribe
domestic airline fares. Even under the regime established by the
DPFI, the CAB has allowed a substantial amount of price com-
petition through discount fares."
Any review of historic regulation by the CAB must also in-
clude consideration of what has actually happened in air trans-
portation. The picture that emerges from such an analysis scarce-
ly supports the "dead hand of regulation" theory. This is illus-
trated by a study recently prepared for a group of local service
airlines by Robert R. Nathan Associates.'8 The study compared
air transportation with twelve other major industries, regulated
14 E.g., Resort Airlines, 10 C.A.B. 393 (1949); Aspen Airways, 46 C.A.B. 273
(1967); Wright Airlines, CAB Order No. 72-2-52 (Feb. 14, 1972).
" Perhaps the most notable example is Allegheny Airlines, a non-grandfather
local service airline, which is now the sixth largest domestic airline in terms of
passengers carried.
"I Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation-Phase 9, CAB Order No. 74-3-82,
(Mar. 18, 1974).
17 E.g., National's "No Frill" discount fare, CAB Order No. 75-3-102 (March
25, 1975); United's Bicentennial Fare, CAB Order Nos. 75-2-124 (Feb. 28,
1975), 75-9-84 (Sept. 24, 1975) and Allegheny's "Liberty Fare", CAB Order
No. 75-5-55 (May 10, 1975).
18 Robert R. Nathan Associates, The Performance of the U.S. Air Transporta-
tion Industry, a study submitted to the CAB with the Comments of Eight Local
Service Carriers, CAB Docket No. 28490 (Jan. 20, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Nathan Study].
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and unregulated, and with the U.S. economy as a whole, for the
twenty-five year period 1949-1974. It compared growth, output,
employment, productivity, prices, and profits. In summary it found:
The performance of the U.S. airline industry has been superior to
that of other U.S. industries. By standards of performance ex-
pected from vigorous competition or effective regulation, the rec-
ord of the airline industry in the post-World War II period is im-
pressive: compared with other industries, its productivity has been
high and dynamic in terms of growth; its prices have been rela-
tively stable; its rate of return on equity has been modest.1
The findings of the Nathan study with respect to airline prices
are especially significant. They are reflected in the following table
from the study:"°
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE OF CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR
ALL ITEMS AND FOR MODES OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
1964-74 AND 1969-74
Average annual rate of change
of Consumer Price Index (percent)
Item 1964-74 1969-74
All items --- 4.7 6.1
Public transportation 5.1 5.6
Airplane fares,
chiefly coach 3.9 5.9
Local transit fares 5.4 5.3
Taxicab fares ------------------- 5.6 6.7
Railroad fares, coach ------------ 3.1 4.6
Bus fares, intercity 5.8 7.8
Source: BLS, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1975,
Reference Edition.
The study also compared airline fares in the U.S. with those in
Europe. The conclusion: "Fares on equidistant routes carrying ap-
proximately the same number of passengers are substantially lower
in the United States than in Western Europe."'"
All this is not intended to portray the CAB's regulatory history
as an unblemished record of perfection. Obviously, a great deal of




the progress of air transportation is related to advances in engine
and airframe technology. Moreover, even though the CAB has for
most of its history been receptive to price competition and has
made great strides in eliminating monopolies and certificating new
entrants, it is clear with the help of hindsight that some things might
have been done better, particularly with respect to encouraging in-
novation and discouraging concentration. Yet, the fact remains
that the CAB has the power, and has generally had the willingness,
to allow the forces of competition to play a major role in accomp-
lishing the statutory objectives." And the fact remains that the U.S.
has today a comprehensive, economical, and efficient system of air
transportation. This needs to be remembered when considering the
risks of adopting legislation such as the Aviation Act of 1975.
II. THE RISKS OF DEREGULATION TO THE SCOPE AND QUALITY
OF AIRLINE SERVICE
Advocates of deregulation of air transportation acknowledge that
their proposals may involve a trade-off-poorer airline service in
return for lower prices.' They see this as only a risk, and a risk
worth taking. The discussion below will look separately at each
side of the possible trade-off with particular reference to the en-
suing effect if the Aviation Act of 1975 is adopted."
Deregulation theory predicts that lower prices will be the result
of the increased competition expected to result from freer entry
22 It is significant moreover that when the Board ignores its obligation to ad-
vance competition, the courts are available to remind it of the statutory require-
ments. The recent decision of the D. C. Circuit in Continental Airlines v. CAB,
519 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975) which held that, when sufficient traffic exists,
certification of competing carriers is mandated by the statute, goes far toward
assuring against future lapses in the Board's commitment to competition.
2E.g., CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT OF THE
CAB SPECIAL STAFF, 173, 278, App. A at 9 (1975).
2 The discussion which follows assumes that the void created by federal de-
regulation will not be filled by state regulation. This is an assumption and not
a prediction. State economic regulation of airlines, including regulation of entry,
is already substantial and claims of state jurisdiction are becoming increasingly
assertive. (See, e.g.: National Association of Regulation Utility Commissioners
v. CAB, D.C. Cir. No. 75-2133, and P.U.C. of California v. CAB, D.C. Cir.
No. 75-2070, pending proceedings seeking to narrow the CAB's assertion of
jurisdiction over "interstate air transportation.") There is every reason to ex-
pect that, in the absence of the firm control of entry and exit at the federal
level, a patchwork of state regulation will develop, doing violence to the ob-
jectives of both the present statute and the proposed "Aviation Act."
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and exit of carriers. The question of whether prices would in fact be
reduced by deregulation is discussed later. First, however, it is use-
ful to consider what the effect of freer entry and exit may be on the
air service itself. Will it become more competitive? What will be
the overall effect on the quality of service, especially at smaller
cities?
A. Effect on Air Service in Larger Markets.
The effects of deregulation on local airline service are best ex-
amined by first looking at the potential impact on the larger mar-
kets which comprise the bulk of the nation's airline passengers and
which function in a symbiotic relationship with the local service sys-
tem.
There is little question that, at least initially, the airline system
as a whole will suffer from deregulation of entry and exit. A recent
study prepared by the Stanford Research Institute found:
There seems to be a general consensus, however, except among
the most doctrinaire decontrollers, that the transition period to rela-
tively unregulated freedom of entry could be chaotic and devastat-
ing to some participants including a number of existing airlines.'
Obviously, airline passengers will not be insulated from these ef-
fects. The airline system is a true system of interlocking services
and arrangements. Because this system works relatively smoothly,
the thousand details which make it work tend to be forgotten-
computer interconnections, timely schedule publications and co-
ordination, establishment of ticketing, gate, and baggage handling
facilities, training of employees, compliance with safety regulations,
arrangements for transfers of passengers, interline account settle-
ments and all the rest. In due time, these can be adjusted to accom-
modate change. But it is foolish to assume that the process of ad-
justment to deregulation will not disrupt some of these arrange-
ments and all the rest. In due time, these can be adjusted to accom-
pany money lost.
The Aviation Act of 1975 reflects an awareness of the risks of
abrupt deregulation; not all of its proposed changes would take
25 1 STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FUEL SHORT-
AGES ON COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AND AVIATION MANUFACTURE 137
(Study prepared for Federal Energy Administration).
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place immediately. The following is a summary of the principal sta-
tutory changes with respect to entry and exit and the proposed ef-
fective dates.
SUMMARY OF NEW
ENTRY AND EXIT PROVISIONS OF THE
"AVIATION ACT OF 1975"
And Their Proposed Effective Dates
Proposed Provisions
1. Any fit, willing and able car-
rier entitled to certificate in
any city pair not receiving
non-stop service.
2. Any air carrier may operate
aircraft up to fifty-six passen-
ger capacity without a certi-
ficate.
3. No certificate restrictions
may be imposed.
4. All existing certificate re-
strictions shall be removed.
5. Any carrier may operate
non-stop between any points
certificated to it on
January 1, 1975.
6. Domestic "fill-up" rights for
U.S. international air carriers.
7. Any carrier may abandon
service operated below "fully
allocated cost" (including re-
turn on investment) after one
expense after three months,
or on ninety days notice if an-
other carrier will provide the
service.
8. Any carrier may operate in
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certificated as long as the
total amount of such opera-
tions does not exceed ten per-
cent (or five percent for
trunks) of the average of all
carriers in its class.
This phasing of deregulation may or may not reduce the impact
on passengers. A number of its important provisions would still be
effective immediately. Moreover, the proposed phasing will not de-
lay the adverse effects of deregulation on airline capital formation,
effects which could turn out to be the most serious of all. In any
case, there should be no illusions about where the legislation ulti-
mately leads. Despite retention of the formalities of certification
and various other procedural trappings, the bill, by virtue of the
interaction of its various provisions, would essentially deregulate
entry and exit by the end of 1980."
Ironically, although instability is risked in the early stages of de-
regulation, the longer term risks are the opposite. In the larger air-
line markets especially, the risk is too much stability, a stability aris-
ing from the control of most of the airline business by a few very
large carriers. This is where deregulation can do its greatest mis-
chief.
There have always been strong tendencies toward concentration
in air transportation, stronger than in many other industries. This
is in part because of the special characteristics of airline traffic. The
airline system is more than a collection of unrelated city pairs." It
is a web of highly interdependent markets. This interdependence
has been described by a CAB staff report as follows:
More than half the passengers on the typical flight segment are
2 For example, under proposed section 401(a) (1) carriers would obtain non-
stop authority between all points certificated to them as of 1/1/75 and they
would be free to extend service to a variety of new cities without regard to "pub-
lic convenience and necessity" by virtue of the provisions of proposed sections
401(d)(4), 401(d)(5), 401(o)(1), and 401(p). Since no restrictions are per-
mitted pursuant to 401 (e) (1), carriers would apparently thereby acquire non-stop
authority between each such new city and every other city it served. By the same
token, the combination of the provisions permitting exit from unprofitable mar-
kets, combined with rate provisions which permit a carrier to make any market
unprofitable, leave little realistic control over exit by the Board.
21E.g., proposed section 401(e)(1) of the "Aviation Act" would have all
certificates read in terms of city pairs rather than linear routes.
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'beyond traffic.' That is, their trip takes them beyond either the
origin, the destination, or both, of the flight segment in question.
Airlines, therefore, typically schedule their aircraft to include two
or more segments or stages per complete flight (i.e., one or more
'intermediate stops'). Two-thirds of all scheduled flights have two
or more stages. For the passenger, this sequential staging has the
advantage of greatly reducing the number of changes of plane that
would be necessary if each flight segment were discrete. For the
airline, the sequential staging of flights permits an aggregation of
passengers having different origins and/or destinations beyond what
would be possible if every passenger origin were to be linked to
every passenger destination with a non-stop flight.28
The same staff report also noted: "Only a rather limited number
of city pair markets in the U.S. have sufficient 'Local 0 & D' traffic
volume to justify turnaround service, . . .""
These characteristics of the airline system are of the utmost sig-
nificance to deregulation. They mean that in most of the U.S. air-
line system the competitive strength of a particular carrier in a par-
ticular market will depend heavily upon the amount of "beyond"
or "flow" traffic that carrier can call upon to help support the
schedules it offers. The simple fact is that in the vast majority of
markets a carrier which does not have access to traffic moving be-
yond one or both points in a particular city pair cannot compete
with a carrier which does." Obviously, the larger a carrier's route
system, the greater the likelihood that it will be able to call upon
flow traffic to support a competitive effort in a new city pair. In
short, without regulation of entry, the bigger the carrier, the bigger
it is likely to get!
The insistent pressure toward concentration in the airline indus-
try is illustrated by its history. In 1950, after certification by the
Board of a large number of new carriers, fifty-eight certificated
2S CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Evaluation of a Limited Market Experiment in
Deregulation of Air Transport 8 (1975).
29 Id.
30 This was one of the reasons the CAB Staff Task Force recommended against
a limited experiment in deregulation in certain test markets. The report noted:
For carriers having little traffic flow between the test segment and
their existing routes, the test segment provides an opportunity of
little worth, unless such flow can be developed or the traffic density
on the test segment is such as to justify turnaround service.
Id. at 8-9.
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route carriers were in operation. In 1973 there were thirty-nine."'
Including supplemental airlines, the Board has certified over fifty
new carriers in addition to grandfather carriers. Yet, this has been
the experience:
Trunklines: U.S. scheduled domestic and international services
are now performed by ten trunks plus Pan American. Ten addi-
tional domestic carriers and three international carriers were
awarded grandfather certificates for scheduled service but are no
longer in existence. Several carriers certificated in the post-grand-
father era, such as American Overseas, Trans Caribbean and Re-
sort Airlines have also disappeared. There have been some mer-
gers among trunklines. But a significant number of other mer-
gers which would have greatly increased concentration have not
taken place, due in part to the requirement for CAB approval
(e.g., American-Eastern, American-Western, Pan American-
TWA, Northwest-National).
Local Service Carriers: Certificates were issued to over twenty
local service airlines in the early stages of the local service ex-
periment. Of these, eight survive today. A ninth, Air New Eng-
land, was awarded a certificate in 1974.
Supplementals: Sixty-six large irregular air carriers (then oper-
ating under a blanket exemption) sought certificate authority in
the 1951 Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation. By the late
1950's only twenty-five carriers had survived to become recipients
of large irregular certificates. After these certificates were set by
a court and new authorizing legislation enacted, thirteen were
certificated as supplemental air carriers. Today there are seven
viable supplemental airlines 2 and a merger of two of them is
pending at this writing.
All-Cargo Carriers: At least six domestic all-cargo carriers have
been certificated. Two are still operating.
Helicopter Carriers: At least five have been certificated. Two are
still operating.
Commuter Carriers: These carriers perform scheduled service
with aircraft of up to thirty passengers without a certificate of
public convenience and necessity but pursuant to an exemption
S' CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINES STATISTICS, 1973 (1974).
31 Two of the seven are small domestic carriers offering limited specialized
services.
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granted by the CAB. There are over 150 such airlines registered
with the Board. Statistics recently compiled by the Board show
that ten commuter airlines carried forty-two percent of the
commuter traffic in 1974.' None of the ten were in substantial
competition with each other. This amount of concentration
among commuters is remarkable in light of the one major respect
in which commuters are regulated-the aircraft size limit-
which tends to discourage concentration."
Air Freight Forwarding: A CAB staff study in 1973 noted that,
although there were 249 authorized forwarders, the four largest
companies in this largely unregulated phase of air transportation
accounted for fifty percent of the business.' The experience in
air freight forwarding is particularly instructive. Despite almost
total deregulation and minimal capital requirements for entry,
the Board recently found:
Lack of meaningful competition [has been] a serious problem not-
withstanding the large number of forwarder authorizations. In
terms of revenue, the largest forwarder controlled thirty percent of
the market, while the ten largest forwarders comprised nearly 73
percent.'
The current situation with respect to the scheduled airlines is as
follows. The five largest domestic carriers-United, TWA, Ameri-
can, Eastern and Delta-account for almost seventy percent of do-
mestic revenue passenger miles (rpm's). Internationally, two car-
riers-Pan American and TWA-account for over sixty-five per-
cent of rpm's. Obviously, this concentration is excessive. Never-
theless, but for CAB actions in resisting some mergers and in foster-
ing new classes of carriers, it is likely that the airline industry would
be even more concentrated than it is.
33 CAB FORMs 298 (1975).
' This prohibition in effect denies a commuter carrier the main advantage of
size-use of larger, more efficient aircraft and the commensurate ability to serve
large markets efficiently. Aircraft size limits also are partly responsible for the,
fact that commuter airlines typically operate hub-spoke services rather than linear
routes. Thus a major source of pressure toward concentration found in larger
air transportation markets, desire for access to flow traffic, is absent in the com-
muter industry.
'CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Am FREIGHT FORWARDING: THE DECADE 1963-
1972.
N IU and Airborne Freight Corporation Acquisition, CAB Order No. 75-10-14,
at 4 (October 3, 1975). See also Motor Carrier-Air Freight Forwarder Investiga-
tion; CAB Order No. 69-4-100 at 13 (April 21, 1969).
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Without meaningful CAB regulation of entry and exit, the pres-
sures toward concentration will inevitably take a greater toll on
competition. In the vast majority of airline city pairs, large car-
riers with substantial flow traffic support can, when they choose,
outschedule smaller carriers without such supporting flow. Result:
irresistible pressure toward elimination of the smaller carrier as a
competitor.37 This is likely to happen regardless of the antitrust
laws, which have failed to prevent concentration in many other in-
dustries, or stricter prior restraints contemplated by the proposed
new section 408 of the Aviation Act.3 No statute can prevent air-
line companies from failing or withdrawing from competition as
they discover their inability to match the traffic flows of larger com-
petitors."
B. Effect on Small City Air Service
Shortly after completing the certification of grandfather carriers,
the CAB turned its attention to the question of how best to extend
the reach of scheduled airline service to the less populated areas of
the United States." The local service airlines were the result. Cre-
ation of these carriers reflected a judgment by the Board that this
development would not be undertaken aggressively by the grand-
father trunklines, which still had a lot of growing to do in grand-
37 Many observers believe there is an "S-curve" relationship between capacity
and traffic, i.e., when a carrier offers more than half the flights in a market, its
share of traffic tends to be greater than its share of flights, and vice versa. To
the extent this tendency exits, it augments the ability of large carriers, which
can support more frequent schedules with flow traffic, to dominate a market.
11 For example, proposed new section 408 would limit the CAB's discretion
to approve mergers and would permit the Attorney General to seek de novo
review of a Board approved merger.
3' It should be emphasized that prospects of greater concentration do not
necessarily mean that effective new competition would never be mounted against
a large carrier in a deregulated environment. As noted above, some city pairs
do not require flow traffic support. The large transcontinental markets and some
of the intra-California markets are examples. Despite the attention focused on
such markets, however, they do not account for a significant portion of passengers
in domestic air transportation. (For example, the passengers moving between
Boston/New York/Philadelphia/Washington on one hand and San Francisco/
Los Angeles on the other represent 2.5% of the total domestic passengers.) There
may also be other markets where for one reason or another the large carriers
will choose not to challenge small competitors. These exceptions, however, do
not detract from the probability that, systemwide, domestic air transportation will
in time display increasing characteristics of oligopoly, with all the adverse effects
on competition that term implies.4 Cf. Investigation of Local Feeder and Pickup Service, 6 C.A.B. 1 (1944).
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father markets. Through the late 40's and early 50's the local serv-
ice carriers were granted experimental certification, each certificate
containing the explicit statement that its primary purpose was to
provide for short-haul local transportation.
Eight of the original local service carriers, or their corporate suc-
cessors, survive today. In 1975 the eight locals, plus newly certifi-
cated Air New England, carried thirty-five million passengers and
served 549 cities in the forty-eight contiguous states. Of these, 249
received their only certificated service from a local carrier. The na-
ture of local service operations is illustrated by the fact that, al-
though these carriers collectively account for less than ten percent of
domestic revenue passenger miles, they perform one-third of all
scheduled airline departures in the United States.
4 1
It is this portion of the air transportation system that is in greatest
jeopardy from deregulation. The impact can be expected immediate-
ly and directly in terms of poorer service. Ultimately the interaction
of poorer service and other consequences of deregulation can be ex-
pected to result in the economic demise of most if not all local serv-
ice carriers.
1. Non-certificated competition
If deregulation takes the course proposed by the Aviation Act of
1975 it will permit any carrier, new or established, to operate air-
craft of up to fifty-five passenger capacity in any city pair without a
certificate of public convenience and necessity. Aircraft of this size,
such as Convair 580's and F-27's, still form the backbone of certi-
ficated services to weaker traffic points. Locals now operate approx-
imately 185 such aircraft and enplane about twenty-five percent of
their passengers on them.
It can be argued that only a fool would acquire these larger air-
craft to engage in competition with a local carrier in a market
which is already too small to support one carrier without subsidy.
That may be, but the history of air transportation suggests that there
is an allure to running an airline that seems to drive otherwise sen-
41 Because locals provide service to more remote and thinly populated areas,
with relatively short aircraft hops, many of their operations are inherently un-
economic. For this reason, pursuant to Section 406(b) of the Act (49 U.S.C.
5 1376(1)) they are paid federal subsidy. However, with the help of stronger
routes awarded by the CAB and more efficient aircraft, subsidy payments have
declined from about $30 per passenger in 1947 to less than $2 in 1974.
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sible people toward economic self-destruction. This is particularly
evident in the commuter airline industry, to which the proposed new
fifty-five passenger limit would apply. Relatively low capital re-
quirements make new entry easy, but the harsh economies of small
city service create the effect of a fast revolving door.'
Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect that a substantial number
of non-certificated carriers will acquire fifty-five consistency passen-
ger aircraft and attempt to operate them in competition with local
service carriers. ' Conceivably, they may also offer lower fares in an
effort to oust the certificated carrier. The result, temporarily, may
be a surfeit of good air service. But it will be temporary. In a
large number of cases, the certificated carrier, which is likely to
have a more realistic view of the economics of serving small cities,
can be expected to take quick advantage of the easy exit provisions
of the bill. If so, the community in question will find itself served
by a non-certificated carrier instead of a certificated carrier. It may
then discover, too late, that it did not make an even exchange.
Non-certificated carriers are not required to serve any point.
" CAB statistics show that, of the 152 commuter airlines registered in fiscal
year 1972, only 73 were still registered in calendar year 1974, an attrition rate of
over fifty percent for the period. During the same period 72 new carriers came into
being. This condition has been characterized by the CAB's Office of Consumer Ad-
vocate as "unstable, if not chaotic." See Comments of the Office of Consumer Ad-
vocate, CAB Docket No. 28048 (December 2, 1975).
A recent study of air freight forwarding, in which entry is also unregulated,
suggests a correlation between financial weakness and both higher rates and poor-
er service. In a study Professor Fredrick Stephenson, Jr. concludes that "it is far
from clear that the Board's [free entry] policy is accomplishing its objectives."
Stephenson, Transport Deregulation-The Air Freight Forwarder Experience,
43 ICC Paxc. J. 39, 54 (1975). The study goes on to find:
In the hub markets, this has resulted in a fragmentation of the traffic
base, higher rates to shippers, higher costs to forwarders and car-
riers, and financial instability for many forwarding firms. Of more
importance, the competition resulting from the policy has discour-
aged many forwarding firms from trying to develop the potential
nonhub markets, because the profit incentive is not strong enough
for some, and 'others are too weak financially to pursue the traffic
they would like to seek.
Id.
41 This will occur even though the increase in 1972 to a thirty-passenger limit
(in lieu of the previous limit-the equivalent of fifteen to eighteen passengers) has
not had a substantial impact. The difference is that aircraft which can make effec-
tive use of the thirty-passenger standard in typical commuter markets simply do
not exist. Such would not be true of aircraft meeting the fifty-five passenger
standard. Although a generation old, there are many aircraft of this size available.
They offer large cabins, jet-prop power, and other amenities not generally found
in non-certificated services.
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They are free to cease service at will. Over 100 commuter carriers
apparently did just that in a recent two and a half year period."
Moreover, commuter services may be cancelled without notice. Ex-
cept for certain joint rates, non-certificated commuters are also
exempt from the all-rate regulation. They may charge what the
traffic will bear; they may offer discriminatory rates; they need file
no tariffs. '
This is not to say that the substitution of a non-certificated car-
rier will always produce less reliable or more expensive service.
There are notable instances when this is not the case." But unless
it is assumed the existing restrictions against service abandonments
and excessive rates by certificated carriers are providing no public
protection at all, removal of those provisions will mean poorer, less
dependable air service at smaller cities and in more remote areas.
It may also be more expensive service. The theory that free entry
and exit will hold down fares is not well supported by commuter
experience. In a submission to the CAB in January, 1976, the
local service carriers analyzed fares in eighteen leading commuter
markets.' The analysis showed that in only two of the eighteen
markets did commuters charge less than the CAB prescribed coach
fare formula. In ten of the markets the commuter faced no certi-
ficated competition; in eight of these the commuters' charges were
within the same fare range as permitted local service carriers. i.e.,
at or above (to a maximum of thirty percent) the CAB prescribed
coach fare formula."'
4See note 40 supra.
45 For a list of economic provisions of the Act from which commuters are
exempt see 14 C.F.R. 298.11 (1975).
4Notably those where the substitution of a commuter for a certificated car-
rier is approved by the CAB subject to conditions requiring maintenance of
specified minimum services and maximum fares and joint fares. E.g., CAB Order
Nos. 75-5-45; 74-11-88 (November 19, 1974).
Moreover, in certain specific cases the CAB has found that operation of up
to fifty-six passenger aircraft by commuter carriers was in the public interest. The
approval of non-certificated large aircraft operations in a specific case after analysis
of competitive effects is very different than the blanket grant of such authority
without regard to its effect.
47 The markets studied were all which fell within the top fifty in commuter
traffic and had a nonstop distance of at least 100 miles. See Comments of Eight
Local Service Airlines on the Proposed Aviation Act of 1975, CAB Docket No.
28490 App. B. (January 20, 1976).
41 The CAB's DPFI Orders allow locals to charge up to 130% of the coach
fare formula. See CAB Order No. 74-12-109 (December 27, 1974).
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The prospect that non-certificated fares may be higher than local
service carrier fares is increased by two other factors. First, uneco-
nomic local carrier operations generally receive federal subsidy;
non-certificated carriers are not eligible for subsidy.'9 Secondly,
local service carriers operate some strong routes which help sup-
port their small city services. Commuter carriers typically lack this
capability for internal cross-subsidization.
2. Loss of Connecting and Flow Traffic
The impact of the proposed Aviation Act on local airlines serv-
ice will not be limited to the risks that go with non-certificated
competition. Thirty-eight percent of the passengers boarded by
local service carriers connect to another carrier, usually a trunk-
line. Thus, anything that destabilizes trunkline service will affect
the interline connections on which so much local service traffic de-
pends.
The effect of this on the local carrier is likely to be far greater
than on the trunk. Local carrier traffic, being shorter haul, is far
more susceptible to the competition of surface transportation, prin-
cipally highways. Any loss of public confidence in the reliability
of connecting service could take a serious toll on local carrier
traffic. Loss of traffic support for a service which is economically
marginal in the first place tends to lead to poorer service. This us-
ually means poorer traffic and, in turn, further cuts in service qual-
ity-a downward spiral that seldom stops short of total suspension.
The last resort is of course subsidy, either external, in the form
of higher federal payments, or internal, in the form of profits from
stronger routes. Historic CAB policies give little hope for the for-
mer. Deregulation is a major threat to the latter. Locals do operate a
number of relatively strong routes, often in competition with trunk-
lines. But the free entry provisions of the bill expose all such routes
to new competition. While locals would also be free to enter new
markets, in such a competitive free-for-all, for the reasons noted
above, the survivors will almost certainly be the very large car-
riers. The competitive problems of the locals will also be com-
pounded by inroads on their own flow traffic as a result of non-
certificated operations at small cities or, as permitted by the pro-
49 See Air Line Pilots Association, International v. CAB, 515 F.2d 1010 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
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posed legislation, operation by new carriers of non-stop services
in markets served one-stop by locals."0
In sum, deregulation is likely to reduce the amount of flow traf-
fic that locals can develop from their smaller points, and decrease
the possibility of retaining existing strong routes or acquiring new
ones. The combination is as good a formula for the extinction of
these carriers as can be imagined. With their demise will go the
commitment which local service airlines represent to the preserva-
tion and development of rural America.
III. THE ECONOMIC RIsKS OF DEREGULATION
As noted, the prime objective of deregulation is to lower the cost
of airline service to the public. This is usually expressed in terms of
lower fares. Obviously, however, the true cost of airline service to
the public involves more than fares. Although more difficult to quan-
tify, time and energy also have economic value. Hence, lower fares
at the cost of poorer service may be a bad bargain. A city which has
lost its only air service is hurt economically even if air fares are
lower at a point 100 miles away. A city which keeps its air service
but loses flights or connections which are convenient to its business
community may also be worse off, even with lower fares.
As shown above, there is a substantial risk that not only small
cities, but the entire nation will get poorer service as a result of de-
regulation. Where then is the offsetting benefit in terms of lower
fares for scheduled service, especially for local airline service? Con-
sideration of that question as it pertains to local service best begins
with an attempt to assess what may happen to scheduled fares on
an industry-wide basis.
A. Industry-wide Fares
The threshhold question is this: Is it appropriate to assume that
the United States can maintain a system where airline fares do not
cover fully allocated costs on a long-term basis? Such a system can
50 The provision of the proposed Aviation Act authorizing non-stop operations
by any carrier on a blanket basis in markets not receiving such service reflects a
fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of traffic flows. A city pair too
small to support non-stop service may be able to support one-stop service and at
the same time offer traffic support necessary to permit non-stop service in ad-
joining city pairs. Diversion of the one-stop traffic to an uneconomic non-stop
service could adversely affect non-stop service in the adjoining markets.
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be projected. As noted previously, there is an attraction about the
airline business which seems to transcend economic sense. Even
without unregulated entry, the number of business failures in the
industry has been impressive. Yet there has also been a steady
stream of new companies seeking fortune where others have failed.
Thus, it at least is conceivable that in an environment of unregu-
lated competition, the air transportation system could be sustained
indefinitely by an unending flow of unprofitable enterprises replac-
ing each other.
However realistic or unrealistic this possibility may be, anything
which contemplates an airline industry supporting itself indefinitely
on improvident private investment must be rejected. Not only is
there an undesirable relationship between marginal financial con-
dition and marginal safety practices,51 but the American economy is
simply too dependent on air transportation to gamble its future on
an assumption of rotating corporate suicides. Limited as was re-
liance on airline service in 1938, the need for financial stability
was an important reason for adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Today, with the vast bulk of intercity transportation of passengers
dependent on airlines, it is unthinkable. That being the case, it fol-
lows that any fare savings projected as a result of deregulation must
be related to cost savings which deregulation generates."' The fol-
lowing analysis examines the prospects for cost savings and com-
mensurate fare reduction, under two opposing models: increased
concentration and increased competition.
Assumption No. 1: Increased Concentration
According to theory, in a deregulated environment carriers will
set their prices so as to recover no more than costs. That result, how-
ever, cannot be predicted if the airline industry evolves into a tight-
er oligopoly. As one experienced observer has pointed out:
The economic reasons which have led the courts to impose strin-
gent checks on individual monopoly power are in most respects
51 FAA safety regulations, while comprehensive, still rely on carrier compli-
ance for their effectiveness. As the Stanford study pointed out: "It is not certain
that the FAA resources would be capable of assuring adequate safety in a vastly
expanded air transportation system except after a period of adjustment or en-
largement." (Vol. 1, p. 137.)
62 Since airline industry profits are, and for some time have been, minimal or
non-existent, fare reductions through profit reductions is not a realistic possibility
and is not considered here.
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applicable to the shared monopoly power of a tight ologopoly.
Both situations are characterized by an absence of vigorous price
competition, wider price-cost margins than would exist under ef-
fective competition, protection of inefficient firms, and a consequent
misallocation of economic resources (emphasis added).'
A well-known economic text concludes as follows:
Industries in which the 8 largest sellers control more than 70
per cent of sales seem to run higher profit rates than industries
with lower concentration. Possibly this level of concentration
marks the point where firms start seriously to take account of their
influence on one another-where oligopoly really comes into its
own."
Under this definition-seventy percent of the business controlled
by the eight largest companies-oligopoly has already now "come
into its own" in the airline industry. All that stands in its way are
the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.
Ironically, the proposed rate provisions of the Aviation Act of
1975 could facilitate the further development of oligopoly. Under
the present statute the CAB can, and does, exercise a tight rein on
increases in fares. Under the proposed bill carriers making up the
oligopoly would be free to increase fares ten percent a year with-
out the fares being suspended by the Board.' The bill would also
substantially eliminate the CAB's power to require that fares con-
form to costs by mileage block. This is meaningful because the cost
of long-haul operations tends to be substantially lower per mile than
short haul operations. The proposed bill would facilitate the historic
practice of large carriers, which ended only with the CAB's DPFI
decision 6 to establish a fare structure in which long-haul passengers
pay substantially more than cost. Other forms of price discrimina-
tion between cities and regions could also flourish in an oligopolistic
air transportation industry since the Board's power to suspend a fare
on grounds of discrimination alone would be eliminated.
11 Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1207, 1225-6.
'
4 Caves, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 107
(2d ed. 1967) (footnote omitted).
See proposed new section 1002(g).
56 DPFI, Phase 9, CAB Order No. 74-3-82 (March 18, 1974).
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Assumption No. 2: Increased Competition
Cost savings stimulated by deregulation will occur either by vir-
tue of savings in costs directly caused by regulation, or indirect sav-
ings related to elimination of economic constraints associated with
regulation.
Direct costs of regulation: Proponents of the Aviation Act of
1975 will not seriously argue that the bill would lower the direct
costs of regulation to the carriers. The major costs of government
regulation of air transportation relate to safety. The bill does not
propose less safety regulation. The major costs of economic regula-
tion relate to such matters as accounting, reporting, and tariff re-
quirements. These would not change. Provisions relating to entry,
exit, and rates would change, but would not necessarily be less com-
plex procedurally and hence probably not generative of substantial
cost savings. New provisions relating to mergers, control, and agree-
ments are intended to be more restrictive and another agency, the
Justice Department, is injected more fully into the approval process,
thus raising the possibility that regulatory costs related to these pro-
visions may actually increase.
Costs related to regulation: The principal areas where cost sav-
ings are possible for airlines are: (a) labor costs, which amount to
almost one-half of operating costs; (b) costs related to investment
in flight equipment and its productivity; (c) costs of wasted produc-
tion, i.e., excess capacity and other kinds of non-price competition.
(a) Labor costs: Advocates of deregulation appear to regard
lower labor costs of new carriers as a major reason deregulation will
result in lower fares. It is assumed that new entrants will not face
the same demands from organized labor and therefore will pay low-
er wages and less expensive "duty rigs" and fringe benefits than es-
tablished carriers. This will not only permit carriers to charge low-
er fares, but will require established carriers to find a way to reduce
their own labor costs or risk being driven out of business. There are
weaknesses in this theory on both practical and policy grounds.
First, it assumes that new entrants will not only start out with
lower labor costs but will maintain lower costs even when they have
reached a large enough size that their fares will have a significant
impact on the system. It is true that small new carriers, such as com-
muter airlines, can and do engage in air transportation while paying
LOCAL AIRLINE SERVICE
lower wages than larger carriers. Local service carriers enjoyed such
status at one time. That advantage disappeared, however, as the
locals and their aircraft grew to competitive size. Thus, new entrants
whose operations and flight equipment become substantially com-
petitive with established carriers are likely to find themselves sub-
ject to intense pressure from organized labor to conform to the
labor costs of the established airlines.
The fact that there will be a time lag before new entrants reach
the labor costs of established carriers will probably not be significant
in terms of systemwide air transportation costs. During the period
a new carrier is behind in its labor costs, it is also likely to be behind
other carriers in terms of economies of scale, access to flow traffic
and public acceptance. By the time the carrier catches up in these
respects, its labor costs are likely to have also caught up.
The theory that labor costs will be forced down also raises sub-
stantial policy and political questions which by themselves may
frustrate its realization. In the sense that deregulation is an effort to
lower airline labor costs, it is a collateral attack on historic gov-
ernment policies toward organized labor, in air transportation and
in general. Wages and working conditions in air transportation to-
day are not caused by the indifferent acceptance of labor's demands
by regulated airlines. They are to a large extent the result of the
federal policies embodied in the Railway Labor Act and other sta-
tutes and regulations designed to encourage protracted bargaining,
minimize strikes, and otherwise advance the health, welfare, and
safety of airline personnel. The proposed legislation is nothing less
than a repudiation of those policies and penalization of carriers
that have been subject to them. If it is believed that airline labor
costs are excessive, a more straightforward approach would be to
put the focus of regulatory reform where it belongs--on the agen-
cies and policies which directly affect airline labor costs.
This is surely a matter which will not escape the attention of
Congress. Any realistic assessment of what deregulation will ac-
complish must therefore take account of the fact that, whatever
other advantages Congress may see in deregulation, it is unlikely to
agree to its major premise-substantial reductions in airline wages
and benefits.
(b) Aircraft operating costs: The second major cost element re-
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lates to flight equipment. The most important force working toward
low air fares for the American public is not a particular kind of reg-
ulation or non-regulation, but aircraft and engine technology,
which has held down unit costs remarkably in the face of inflation.
Any change in regulatory approach which reduces the ability of the
airline industry to support new technology will cost the public far
more than any regulatory action or inaction possibly could.
There is good reason to ask whether the proposed legislation may
not discourage the development of new technology. On one hand,
if concentration becomes serious enough, competitive incentives to
pay for new technology may be jeopardized. The development of
new aircraft requires the investment of enormous sums by the air-
craft industry and a commensurately high price for the product.
On the other hand, if the airline industry is weakened by un-
economic competition, the chances of heavy capital investment in
new technology are weakened also-another self-defeating result.
Even if technological advances in engine and air frame manu-
facture continue, the benefits will not necesarily favor new entry.
The capital costs of aircraft are substantial, and tend to be higher
for the newer, more efficient models. Typically, new entrants will
have to go to the same sources of capital as established airlines.
Even in today's regulated environment, established airlines are dis-
covering that capital for new equipment is expensive and hard to
find. If the existing serious shortage of capital for airline financing
is any indication, deregulation will produce a total drought from
institutional sources.
By the same token, it is not reasonable to assume that new en-
trants will be able to compete by using cheap obsolescent equip-
ment. Where jets are available at lower prices, it generally has to do
with their high cost of operation or lower passenger appeal. Hence,
the kind of aircraft a new entrant could acquire at lower capital
cost would in all likelihood involve higher operating costs, aggra-
vated by more frequent overhaul requirementse' or marketing disad-
" Equipment leasing is sometimes mentioned as an alternative. However,
leased aircraft must be owned and financed by someone. That someone must go
to the same money markets as established airlines and, like established airlines,
must show a likelihood that the equipment will be able to pay for itself. The
prospect that the leased aircraft will go to a new and unproven airline will not
make it any easier for the lessor to obtain the financing than the lessee carrier.
"a Airline maintenance cost are affected greatly by the time between overhauls
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vantages tending to offset lower wage scales. Moreover, even obso-
lescent aircraft could become expensive. If the proposed legislation
did succeed in developing a number of new entrants, the supply of
appropriate aircraft would not be sufficient to support the increase
in competition. Hence, new entrants would find themselves paying
inflated prices for less efficient aircraft.
(c) Costs of unused capacity: One of the principal areas of airline
cost-and hence possible savings-is wasted capacity, i.e., seats not
sold. Deregulation theory appears to assume that one of the major
benefits of added competition will be fare savings associated with
higher load factors. Higher load factors are unquestionably an im-
portant means of permitting lower fares. And experience with pro-
motional fares shows that a properly designed fare reduction can
increase load factors and not adversely affect profits. Such fares
must, however, be designed to stimulate more net new revenue than
they divert from normal fare traffic after taking account of cost
savings in handling the lower fare traffic. These conditions are most
likely to exist in dense markets with a substantial amount of pleasure
travel (e.g., New York-Florida "no frills" service).
Obviously there is a place for promotional innovations which
permit lower fares by reducing wasted capacity. The question is
whether deregulation is necessary to get them. Although not all in-
novations have received quick Board approval, there have been a
great many, and they continue today under the DPFI."9 Even if it
were concluded that an effort should be made to speed up the
CAB's reaction time to innovation, it is questionable whether the
proposed legislation is appropriate. Indeed, it would seem that suc-
cessful innovation in fares and services is more likely to occur in
an environment which favors a large number of strong established
competitors, while still providing for the new entrant with a better
idea, than in the kind of highly concentrated system deregulation is
likely to produce.
Normal fares: To the extent deregulation theory assumes that
load factors will be improved by a lowering of normal fares on a
broad scale, it encounters a heavy burden. First, by taking away
much of the CAB ratemaking power it necessarily assumes that a
(t.b.o.'s) of engines and airframes allowed by the FAA. These t.b.o.'s are tradi-
tionally low for new carriers, increasing only as justified by experience.
" See note 16 supra.
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systemwide raising of load factors and lowering of fares will be the
result of market forces alone. The CAB has the power to prohibit
fares based on load factors which it believes are below those reason-
ably allowable, and it is actively exercising that power." Deregula-
tion would deny the Board that power.
Nor is there any factual basis for assuming that market forces
will do the job. Carriers who lower normal fares on the assumption
they will raise their load factors confront the virtual certainty that
their reductions will be matched by competitors. Airlines will be-
cause they must, match each other's fare reductions. Therefore, a
carrier which 'introduces lower normal fares (and continues to
provide the same passenger services) must assume that the entire
market will be stimulated enough to produce a compensating in-
crease in its load factors and those of its competitors. Long ex-
perience61 and informed judgments as to the price elasticity in
scheduled air transportation! suggest that this is not likely to hap-
pen.
The assumption of extensive reductions in normal fares is also
at war with certain other provisions of the statute. For example, sec-
tion 404 of the Federal Aviation Act embodies a fundamental policy
prohibiting rates which unjustly discriminate against, or unreason-
ably prejudice, any "person, port, locality, or description of traffic."6
As- that provision is now applied, carriers may not charge less for a
longer haul than a shorter haul even if otherwise justified by traffic
density or competitive factors. Nor, with a few exceptions, may a
carrier charge the same for markets of substantially different dis-
tance. If fares must maintain a reasonable relationship with distance,
60 A CAB proceeding looking toward possible upward revision in load factor
standards is now in progress. Domestic Load Factor Standards, CAB Docket
No. 27417 (Dec. 31, 1975). See CAB Order No. 75-10-107 (October 24, 1975).
41 Although normal fares were not fixed by the CAB for over thirty years, the
Board was forced to conclude that during the period: "Price competition in nor-
mal fares has been virtually non-existent." DPFI, Phase 9, CAB Order No.
74-3-82 at 116 (March 18, 1974). The absence of such competition reflected in
part the almost certain -knowledge that competitors would meet any reduction in
normal fares.
62 See DPFI, Phase 7, CAB Order No. 71-4-59, at 54-69 (April 9, 1971),
CAB Order No. 72-8-50, at 34-39 (Aug. 10, 1972). To the extent that CAB action,
or. the provisions of the proposed bill, may result in a shift of price sensitive traffic
to charter services, the elasticity of scheduled service traffic will be less than that
estimated by the Board in Phase 7.
6349 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1972).
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a carrier's ability to make substantial reductions in selected markets
is obviously more limited than deregulation theory seems to con-
template.
The proposed Aviation Act would also leave undisturbed section
1002(h) of the Federal Aviation Act' which empowers the CAB
to fix divisions of joint rates between carriers. Under that section
the CAB has ordered domestic carriers to divide joint fares in rela-
tion to their respective costs for their portion of the passenger haul.'
If the Board adheres to cost-based divisions, carriers who reduce
fares in a market may find that, under a division formula which
looks at relative costs not fares, a higher proportion of a lower yield
will have to be paid out to connecting carriers. This may tend to dis-
courage reductions, especially by carriers who depend more heavily
on other carriers for connecting traffic."
If, as it appears, widespread reductions in normal fares cannot be
predicted, competition from new entrants will tend to fall into the
traditional mold-service competition. Unable to gain price advan-
tages, airlines usually seek improved load factors by non-price be-
havior. This may be reflected in various attempts at product differ-'
entation-advertising, cabin services, etc. But the most significant
form of such behavior involves adding capacity, i.e., outscheduling
the competition with bigger aircraft or more flights.
. Such behavior is not only inconsistent with the attainment of low-
er costs, but poses special problems for the new entrant. In non-
price competition, established carriers have several major advan-
tages:
( 1 ) Better public identification. As any airline which has tried to
break into a new market can attest, the American public has a great
affinity for familiar names in air transportation.
(2) More beyond traffic flow to support schedule frequencies
which the local market will not support.
(3) Stronger financial resources to weather a competitive strug-
gle.
* In sum, while the odds are great that a new entrant will not be
able to underprice an incumbent's normal fares, they are equally
6449 U.S.C. § 1482(h) (1972).
DPFI, Phase 4, CAB Order No. 72-4-42 (April 10, 1972).
Carriers with extensive route systems would be affected less since they could
rely more on their own system for traffic support.
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great that it will not be able to compete effectively in non-price
terms.
Lower mail revenues: A carrier's ability to offer lower fares
would also be inhibited by a provision of the proposed Aviation Act
which would encourage rates for mail below fully allocated cost.
Currently, mail payments to scheduled airlines, which amount to ap-
proximately $200 million per year, are based on rates fixed by the
CAB. Section 15 of the Aviation Act of 1975 would amend the
Postal Reorganization Act to permit the Postal Service to contract
for mail wherever it (not the CAB) determines that the service
by certificated carriers between one or more pairs of points "is not
adequate for its purposes." No standards are established for such a
determination, and it is apparently non-reviewable.
Upon making such a determination the Postal Service would
then be empowered to institute competitive bidding, or negotiations,
for mail rates. Quite apart from the questionable policy represented
by the bill," the effect of this will be to encourage the pricing of mail
on an added, instead of fully allocated, cost basis. The resulting loss
in mail revenue will have to be made up, largely by passenger fares.
B. Local Service Fares
If, as the foregoing analysis suggests, deregulation is unlikely to
result in the predicted price competition, and is likely to lead to the
gradual extinction of local service carriers, the fares paid by small
city passengers will tend to be set in one of two ways: (1) in larg-
er markets, by the members of the oligopoly, or (2) in markets of
no interest to the oligopoly, by non-certificated carriers.
In either case it is difficult to predict benefit for the small city
passenger. In smaller markets short-run price benefits may result
from increased competition and turnover, but in the long run the
fares in these markets will have to cover costs. As noted previously,
without subsidy support, such fares could well be higher than
charged by local carriers.
For small city passengers whose fares are affected by oligopoly
pricing, and this would include the large number of passengers
connecting to oligopoly services, the prospects for lower fares are
67 One of the principal purposes for adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 was to eliminate the abuses stemming from competitive bidding for mail
prior to that time.
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no brighter. Systemwide, oligopoly prices will have to cover costs.
For reasons already noted, they may actually exceed costs, espe-
cially in smaller, less competitive markets. In short, either way the
local service passenger is likely to lose.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it takes the form of legislation, the Aviation Act of
1975 is no less an experiment than many others the CAB has em-
barked on in pursuit of the same goal-a comprehensive, econom-
ical, and efficient air transportation system. The difference is that if
this legislative experiment fails, there will be no quick turning back.
Hence, the risks of this experiment require more cautious and care-
ful evaluation.
The risks are substantial. Obviously, not all those risks identified
above will be, or could be, realized; some are mutually exclusive
with others. But not all risks need to be realized to result in serious
and permanent harm to the air transportation system. Moreover, it
must be remembered that it is an air transportation system that is at
risk. Few other industries are more essential to the functioning of
commerce, the conduct of personal lives, and the achievement of
larger national purposes.
The paradox of the proposed Aviation Act is that it acknowl-
edges this. Were air transportation just another industry, it could
be deregulated in the true sense. But in seeking to preserve much
of the regulation provided by the existing statute, advocates of the
legislation acknowledge that this industry is really too important to
deregulate. If air transportation is important enough to regulate,
it is too important to risk on a theory which says in effect that
whatever the public happens to get in terms of service, competition,
and rates is what it deserves.
This is not to say that nothing can be done better. The percep-
tion that something needs to be changed comes in large part from
the apparent success of intra-state airlines offering low fares in cer-
tain markets. As emphasized above, markets where such operations
have survived are characterized by high traffic density and little de-
pendence on flow traffic. Such markets are, of course, highly unrep-
resentative of the system as a whole, and it is utter foolishness to at-
tempt to advance a regulatory theory for the national system based
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on the experience in such markets. Nevertheless, there is enough
to be learned from that experience to suggest that a separate regu-
latory strategy should be considered for large independent markets,
one which is not inconsistent with the preservation of a national
system of thousands of interdependent markets.
Similarly, it seems clear that the growth of airline oligopoly needs
to be checked with firmer and more clearcut policies. Including the
local service airlines, there are now twenty established and experi-
enced certificated domestic carrier airlines. Even without new en-
trants, that number is more than sufficient to provide for a vigor-
ously competitive system if an effort is made to reduce size dispar-
ities between carriers-rather than, as now, allowing them to in-
crease.
While such objectives could be addressed in legislation, they do
not require it. In the past, the CAB has often shown a willingness
to act forthrightly in developing new policies required by the sta-
tutory goals. It should be recalled, moreover, that the existing sys-
tem of regulation involves not just the CAB, but an effective system
of legislative and judicial oversight. Within the recent past we have
seen that system succeed in helping to refocus the Board's atten-
dion -on the statutory requirements for compeition and economical
air transportation."' Admittedly, it still is an imperfect system. But
it has one advantage the proposed Aviation Act lacks-the assur-
ance that it will not destroy that Which it is supposed to regulate.
. 68 E.g., Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure on Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures,
94th'Cong., 1st Sess., pi. 1-3 (1975).
